he recent financial unrest in Europe has created significant distressed opportunities. Buyers with free capital have been able to obtain significant quantities of distressed assets at free fall pricing. In a typical arms-length transaction, these buyers would leave without further concern for the viability of their counterparties. But these parties may soon find themselves reacquainted with their sweetheart deals if their counterparties fail to weather financial depressions and seek bankruptcy protection before the waves subside.
When storms settle and economies improve, assets whose values were temporarily distressed often experience a sudden rebound in value. Such price fluctuations create incentives for counterparties to reclaim assets that once seemed like broken glass, but now appear to be crown jewels. Fraudulent transfer laws, which date back to the Statute of Elizabeth in the sixteenth-century, 1 allow courts to unwind transactions after the fact. Before June 2011, U.S. bankruptcy courts regularly used fraudulent transfer provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code ("the Code") 2 to reach domestic transactions with little fanfare. 3 But recent shifts in domestic jurisprudence may affect U.S. 
EUROZONE DEBTS & U.S. COURTS 1111
bankruptcy courts' ability to exercise both jurisdiction and constitutional authority over domestic and foreign transfers. This Article discusses the link between the debt crisis in the Eurozone and a potential flood of future litigation to unwind foreign transactions in U.S. courts. Specifically, this article will address the two and a half hurdles litigants must overcome to reach foreign transactions with U.S. bankruptcy law. Part II will briefly describe how economic forces created these distressed opportunities in the Eurozone. Part III will discuss how improving global economies create incentives for fraudulent transfer actions in U.S. courts and analyze a recent example. Part IV will outline how the 2005 Amendments to the Code, an ensuing circuit split over extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's watershed decision in Stern v. Marshall have created the two and a half hurdles. Finally, Part V will offer arguments for litigants to overcome or to defend the hurdles to U.S. adjudication.
I. REASON FOR CONCERN: DISTRESSED OPPORTUNITIES IN THE EUROZONE

A. Economic Woes in the Eurozone
As a harbinger of the 2008 financial crisis, Warren Buffet was famously quoted as saying: "It's only when the tide goes out that you can see who's swimming naked." 4 The financial tides accompanying the aftershocks of the 2008 financial depression uncovered considerable concern for the bare balance sheets across the Eurozone. A severe debt crisis stemming from the banking and property bubbles led to liquidity constraints, defaults, and downgrades across the Eurozone; most notably in Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain. 5 Persistent fiscal profligacy led to two separate sovereign bailouts for Greece, in a union too big to fail. 6 The ripple effects of these financial woes 4 6. See id. Aside from pejorative characterizations, "too big to fail" means that the aggregate gross domestic product ("GDP") of a country is smaller
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
[Vol. 38:3 have reached private sector sources of liquidity, forcing both private and public financial institutions alike to seek liquidity from a consortium of international investors. 7 These efforts are to fill an estimated balance-sheet shortfall of €1 to 1.3 trillion for Europe's major banks. 8 In January 2012, one expert estimated that the Eurozone needed approximately €3 trillion of fresh capital to create sufficient liquidity. 9 To correct the gap between book value and the actual value of the bad assets, the Eurozone must face a significant deleveraging process. 10 Europe has three basic options for deleveraging: (1) raise money, (2) print money, or (3) default and deflate. 11 The third option of markdowns provides immediate relief, but carries significant consequences, including potentially reigniting global financial panic. 12 The European Central Bank ("ECB") appeared to have adopted the second option by the spring of 2012, when it began flooding Europe's banks with more than half a trillion euros of fresh capital. 13 Despite the increased lending and artificially-fixed low rates, many of Europe's major banks have refused to accept funds, opting instead than the potential liabilities of a particular market sector, which is most often the financial or banking sector of an economy.
7 for private investment and off-balance sheet restructurings. 14 If the situation deteriorates and remedial measures prove insufficient, the United States could even take drastic measures to insulate and protect itself, which would leave Europe more vulnerable to take the leverage hemlock alone. 15 In coordination with the ECB's central funding efforts, the Eurozone countries have also completed member-funded bailouts of troubled Eurozone countries. 16 The second round of bailouts for Greece in February 2012 staved off another potentially chaotic liquidity crisis that would have threatened defaults by other member nations, such as Spain and Italy. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble called for significant austerity measures and reforms amidst concern that increasing financial ties with Greece would threaten "[Germany's] ability to pay for pensions and health care in an aging society." 17 Germany insisted throughout the negotiations that Greece adopt austerity measures, tighten public spending, and improve on tax collection. 18 Leaders of the twenty-five EU governments agreed on January 31, 2012, to provide Greece with approximately €130 billion (US$171.5 billion) of aid, which included assistance from the International Monetary Fund. 19 In return, the Greek Parliament agreed to significant austerity measures, yielding to the German-led charge for tighter fiscal discipline. 20 These measures included "steep cuts in private-sector wages, sacking 15,000 public-sector workers and drumming up another [ 
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The measures have caused considerable strife in both the Greek Parliament, where parties were expelled "for not toeing the party line," and the streets of Athens, where protestors continued to oppose any cuts in Greece's public spending. 22 The spending cuts continued for 2013 budgets amid negotiations to reduce Greece's debt to "manageable levels." 23 As in Greece, austerity measures across the Eurozone were met with similar hostilities as workers organized strikes in Spain and Portugal. 24 Cyprus too was forced to agree to overhaul its public finance system and restructure its two biggest banks in return for €10 billion ($13.05 billion) bailout from its international creditors. 25 Although the negotiations remained precarious at the time, EU leaders accepted the Nobel Peace Prize on December 10, 2012, for their efforts. 26 In addition to the bickering among Eurozone countries over austerity and liquidity measures, the Eurozone faces a number of other ancillary barriers that threaten to hinder already weak economies. Amidst these liquidity disruptions-and perhaps because of the constraints-the Eurozone now faces the prospect of exporting its pool of skilled labor, as many former European colonies in Latin America have started to lure skilled professionals. 27 
B. Applying Traditional Definitions of Distressed Assets to the Eurozone
The confluences of the liquidity crisis, infighting over austerity measures, and increased financial ties across the Eurozone have created distressed opportunities for buyers with free capital. Distressed opportunities exist in many forms; in fact, " [t] here is no universally recognized definition of distressed debt." 31 Four general definitions often guide the term, including (1) third-party ratings, (2) liquidity availability, (3) debt spreads, and (4) debt and equity nominal trading values.
Rating agencies, the most common prognosticators of financial strength, are third-party companies that independently assess investment quality. 32 The major rating agencies use different labels to describe a ten-grade system that places bonds below a certain category as being "junk." 33 Ratings affect a company's ability to raise capital as ratings below a certain level prevent certain investors, such as pension and endow- 
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[Vol. 38:3 ment funds, from investing in the company's debt or equity securities. But the rating agencies have been severely criticized for their failure to assess companies' financial viability accurately, most notably in the wake of Enron and the structured investments leading to the 2008 financial crisis. 34 Unfortunately, without sufficient oversight, ratings may be driven-or at least delayed-by politics as much as financial strength. 35 For instance, the long-expected Eurozone downgrades in 2012 were received with little significant reaction in the markets. 36 S&P and Fitch lowered ratings across the Eurozone in January, and Moody's followed suit in February 2012, lowering the ratings of six European nations, and additionally warning that the United Kingdom may also face downgrades. 37 The downgrades continued throughout 2012 as major banks began to boost their cash reserves. 38 Compared to the holistic purview of ratings, a liquidity approach considers discrete events that cause a company or a country to be unable to meet its financial obligations. Such situations may be created when "cheap credit, and not valueadded products, drives a nation's economy or a company's production." 39 When market forces, trade partners, or critical decisions withdraw, or even simply interrupt, the means of immediate liquidity, debt becomes distressed due to a lack of shortterm viability. For example, before investment banks changed structures to borrow directly from the U. S 
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The two remaining definitions of distressed require a more analytical approach. A cost-of-debt approach defines a security as distressed when the spread between the risk-free rate and the company's debt exceeds 1000 basis points. 41 The "risk-free rate" is the rate that investors would expect to earn in a theoretical risk-free environment for a given period, often estimated to be the yield on U.S. Treasury Bills. According to this approach, the major Eurozone debts would have been nearing distressed levels as early as September 2009. 42 The same determination would result under the trading values approach, which considers the nominal trading value of a security. Typical hallmarks of financial distress under this approach include a de minimis equity value or debt trading at a significant discount. 43 Under this definition, Greece's sovereign debt would have qualified as distressed in December 2011 because estimated recovery for bondholders was thirty-two cents on the euro. 44 
C. Examples of Distressed Deals Already Made in the Eurozone
The traditional definitions of distressed debt demonstrate that the Eurozone was likely distressed for a significant period before the rating agencies issued downgrades. 45 
2013] EUROZONE DEBTS & U.S. COURTS 1119 II. INCENTIVES IN FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LITIGATION AND HOW SUCH INCENTIVES MAY CAUSE EUROZONE DEALS TO REPLICATE RECENT HISTORY
A flurry of Eurozone distressed transfers creates a potential problem for foreign investors if two situations were to occur. First, the distressed party selling the assets would have to not survive either the immediate liquidity crisis or the broader economic rebalancing. This failure may initially take the form of an out-of-court restructuring, but could later result in a bankruptcy filing in U.S. courts under Chapters 11 or 15 of the Code. Second, the crisis that caused the opportunity reverses, and the market re-prices the asset at non-distressed levels. After such a recovery, the hindsight view of the original transaction appears significantly stilted-as if the distressed buyer pilfered the spoils of the unwilling seller and stole the crown jewels.
Although this characterization of the distressed transaction tends to inflate the original balance of power, such a hindsight view often leads critics to impugn the actions of the "vulture investor." 56 Vultures, a pejorative term for distressed purchasers, "are so named because they have a predilection for businesses that are dead or dying. . . . [Vultures are] betting that a company on its knees will once again stand up and resume walking." 57 The opinion of two such critics offended by a vulture's success is particularly important: the now-bankrupt seller and its creditors. Significant rebounds in asset prices may lead the distressed seller, or the distressed seller's creditors, to feel taken advantage of or even cheated. This potential situation may even discourage distressed purchasers from completing out-of-court transactions for fear that this unique form of "seller's remorse" will incentivize avoidance actions. 58 Fraudulent transfer laws would appear, at least initially, to allay these reservations. 59 The party seeking avoidance must § § 4-5 (1984) . The UFTA serves as a reasonable proxy for most states' fraudulent transfer laws, while 11 U.S.C. § 548 provides the standard for federal courts. [Vol. 38:3 show that the consideration exchanged did not constitute "reasonably equivalent value" under an actual, quasi, or constructive fraudulent transfer theory. 60 Each of these theories calculates "reasonably equivalent value" as it existed at the time of the transfer. 61 Accordingly, a court must calculate value using industry valuation practices as of the time of the transfer. Such an analysis would likely preclude any recovery, even in distressed situations, because comparable transactions would usually provide a baseline for "reasonably equivalent value." 62 But the potential to recover valuable assets with successful avoidance actions provides an incentive to test the bounds of reasonably equivalent value.
The last three economic cycles have presented remarkably similar iterations of the situation described. 63 None is more indicative of the incentives behind avoidance actions than ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corporation. 64 . Actual fraud requires that "the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." UFTA § 4(a)(1). The other two theories require no such finding. Quasi-constructive fraud occurs when a transaction makes "the remaining assets of the debtor . . . unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction." UFTA § 4(a)(2)(i). Similarly, constructive fraud requires strict liability where a transfer is made for less than "reasonably equivalent value" and is made during or itself causes a debtor's insolvency. UFTA § 5(a Americas Smelting and Refining Company's ("ASARCO") bankruptcy case was perhaps the largest and most complex environmental reorganization to date. 66 For much of the twentieth-century, ASARCO was the leading copper producer in the United States. 67 In 2005, faced with "[l]ow copper prices, labor strikes, environmental liabilities, asbestos claims," and significant bond debts from a leveraged buyout, ASARCO sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Southern District of Texas. 68 The centerpiece of the eventual "100-cent plan" 69 was ASARCO's successful fraudulent conveyance claim against its parent corporation, Grupo Mexico, S.A.B. de C.V. ("Grupo"). 70 ASARCO's bankruptcy counsel, Baker Botts LLP, brought the avoidance action against Grupo to recover the "crown jewel" of ASARCO: a controlling equity interest in the Southern Peru Copper Company ("SPCC"). 71 Low copper prices had depressed the value of the SPCC interest in 2001 after Grupo formed a no-asset company, Americas Mining Corporation ("AMC"), and pursued a leverage buyout of the interest. 72 In short, the SPCC transaction was fraught with complications stemming from ASARCO's perilous financial condition and AMC's/Grupo's tactics to force a deal. Among these complications were that (1) ASARCO 
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[Vol. 38:3 for the SPCC equity; 74 (3) certain ASARCO board members had been asked to resign after withdrawing their consent for the SPCC transaction; 75 and (4) valuation opinions from several investment banks were conflicted on the enterprise value of the transaction. 76 In fact, after one restructuring advisor attempted to withdraw its fairness opinion, ASARCO's pre-bankruptcy restructuring counsel predicted the eventual fraudulent transfer lawsuit. 77 Despite the myriad of complications, the SPCC transaction closed on March 31, 2003. 78 During the period starting the day after the SPCC transaction closed until the time of the fraudulent transfer proceeding, copper prices improved dramatically, rising from approximately US$0.71 per pound to more than US$3.50 per pound. 79 The substantial improvement in copper prices buoyed the estimated value of the SPCC equity interest from an estimated US$811. 4 or US$853 million, to well over US$3 billion. 80 Incentivized by the prospect of recovering the "crown jewel" asset, Baker Botts brought the fraudulent transfer proceeding to recover the SPCC interest on behalf of ASARCO's creditors. 81 Following a four-week bench trial, the district court entered a voluminous, 186-page opinion and order unwinding the SPCC transaction. 82 The court concluded that the price paid for the SPCC interest constituted "reasonably equivalent value," which defeated the constructive fraudulent transfer theory, 83 Over a span of forty pages, the court analyzed "reasonably equivalent value" extensively using three different common valuation methods: (1) Stock Price Valuation, (2) Market Transaction Multiples, and (3) Discounted Cash Flow. Id. at 342. A stock price valuation applies a premium or discount to the historical trading averages of a public equity, but requires an efficient market to serve as a viable value indication. Id. at 342-45. Although the transaction multiple method is a common industry practice, it was not a good indication of the SPCC equity value because the complexities of the case eliminated the field of comparable transactions. Id. at 352-57, n.68. The transaction was still avoidable as an "actual" fraudulent transfer. 84 In addition to the incentive for debtors in avoidance actions, ASARCO provides an example of the incentive for the counsel of the debtor in possession to bring avoidance proceedings or take other actions to augment the estate. 85 The Fifth Circuit affords bankruptcy courts the discretion to enhance attorneys' fees in the rare and exceptional case where counsel accomplishes a substantial recovery for their clients that would not have otherwise occurred without their efforts. 86 Based on the "significant hurdles" faced and the "rare and extraordinary" results produced, 87 the bankruptcy court in ASARCO awarded Baker Botts a US$4 million fee enhancement for its successful avoidance of the SPCC transaction. 88 Other firms received simicourt relied on the Discounted Cash Flow analysis, which considers the future cash flows of an investment, to arrive at a valuation and applied a discount rate to arrive at present value. Id. at 357-62.
84. Id. at 386. In addition to the statutory badges, the court considered suggested badges of fraud, including: (1) pilfering the "crown jewel" asset, (2) order of payment from proceeds, (3) remaining past due obligations left unpaid, (4) 
[Vol. 38:3 lar fee enhancements for asbestos litigation in which claimants received a settlement of almost US$1 billion. 89 These fee enhancements were upheld by the district court 90 and were pending a decision on appeal to the Fifth Circuit at the time of publication. 91 ASARCO demonstrates that foreigners facing litigation in U.S. courts may risk losing their sweetheart deal and having damages or fee enhancements assessed. 92 Depending on the assets exchanged in distressed Eurozone transactions, improvements in the broader economic climate or even intermittent liquidity fixes may create similar financial incentives as rising copper prices did in ASARCO. Likewise, the size of the transactions discussed in ASARCO, presumably comparable to those in the Eurozone, provide significant incentives for debtors and their creditors to challenge the two and half hurdles. insolvencies, contrary to statutory guidance. 93 Empirical evidence suggests this argument creates only a "half hurdle." 94 After they prove that Chapter 15 does not preclude U.S. adjudication, litigants must prove that the Code otherwise allows courts to reach foreign transactions. A split over whether bankruptcy courts may apply the Code extraterritorially has developed since the addition of Chapter 15 in 2005. 95 As of yet, the Supreme Court has denied the opportunity to settle the dispute. 96 Thus, the extraterritoriality hurdle would require carefully choosing the proper forum and then successfully arguing that U.S. courts' jurisdiction under the Code extends beyond the territorial borders of the United States.
III. THE TWO AND
The final hurdle to adjudication in U.S. bankruptcy courts is whether these courts have constitutional authority to determine fraudulent transfer actions of foreign property. 
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[Vol. 38:3 fer actions, 99 Stern also provides the final hurdle for U.S. bankruptcy courts to reach foreign transactions without offending Article III.
A. The Half Hurdle of Chapter 15 of Title 11.
Congress created the first hurdle to U.S. courts' jurisdiction with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"). 100 Among other significant changes to the Code, BAPCPA added the muchanticipated Chapter 15, which created new protocols for handling cross-border insolvency cases. 101 Chapter 15 integrated many of the changes proposed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") in its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. 102 UNCITRAL's Model Law was intended to encourage a universalist approach to crossboard insolvencies and to promote continuity and predictability between courts in different countries. 103 Before BAPCPA's passage, many U.S. bankruptcy scholars argued that international bankruptcies should not incorporate a universalist principle. 104 Professor Lynn LoPucki has advocated for a territorialist approach, which would limit a country's judicial powers to enforcement only within its territorial 99 borders. 105 While supporting a theory of universalism, another prominent U.S. bankruptcy scholar, Professor Jay L. Westbrook, has acknowledged that "it seems unrealistic to think that universalism will be accepted absent roughly similar laws." 106 UNCITRAL's Model Law would appear to address Professor Westbrook's later qualification by creating harmonious laws among different territorial jurisdictions. But to affect a truly universalist change, all jurisdictions that might be forced to cooperate by cross-border insolvencies must have first adopted either the Model Law or laws otherwise comparable. 107 As of January 2012, only nineteen countries have adopted the Model Law, with China and India conspicuously absent from the list. 108 The United States has begun harmonizing its bankruptcy procedures with other international jurisdictions, 109 but Chapter 15 does not provide a clear answer to U.S. courts' ability to reach distressed Eurozone transactions. BAPCPA and Chapter 15 improved U.S. recognition of proceedings and the ability of U.S. courts to apply foreign law to U.S. proceedings. 110 But "neither Chapter 15 nor any other part of the Code extensively covers the opposite question-the degree to which U.S. courts can apply U.S. bankruptcy provisions abroad." 111 Empirical evidence suggests that Chapter 15 may not be "as universalist as its proponents claim it to be." 112 In fact, the evidence suggests that Chapter 15 may be an ineffective solution "to resolve conflicting priority rules between the United States and foreign proceedings." 113 
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[Vol. 38:3 debtors already subject to a foreign proceeding." 114 Chapter 15 also requires that a U.S. court determine whether its case is ancillary to a "foreign main proceeding," 115 which the Code defines as "a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests. fig.1 . The 77.3% figure comes from two categories. First, Leong's findings show U.S. "courts granted entrustment in only 45.5% of cases where foreign proceedings were recognized." Id. at 7. Second, "[w]hen such entrustment was granted, 31.8% of cases were accompanied by qualifying factors," which included imposing U.S. priority laws or requiring assurances such priority distribution schemes would be followed. 
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court's denial of confirmation, 123 the Fifth Circuit has provided an example of U.S. courts applying U.S. law and shunning foreign law. The empirical and substantive evidence of U.S. courts retaining control illustrate the inability of Chapter 15 to address whether U.S. courts can apply U.S. bankruptcy laws extraterritorially. Even in situations where a Eurozone debtor is subject to a foreign proceeding, the current trend since BAPCPA's passage indicates that U.S. courts would not willingly part with jurisdiction without some baseline qualifications. 124 Where no such proceeding exists, litigants in future avoidance actions involving Eurozone distressed assets will therefore face only a "half" hurdle to convincing a U.S. court to apply jurisdiction in light of Chapter 15. But litigants must subsequently address the more daunting hurdle-explaining the statutory and constitutional authority for extraterritorial jurisdiction in bankruptcy courts amidst the confusion surrounding questions left unanswered by Chapter 15.
B. The U.S. Circuit Split Over the Extraterritorial Application of Title 11
Following the passage of BAPCPA and Chapter 15, U.S. courts have maintained the ability to apply U.S. law to issues involving foreign-based property. Courts are generally faced with two questions before they are able to apply U.S. law outside of its territorial borders: (1) Can the statute be applied extraterritorially, and (2) Does such an application violate principles of international comity? 125 For U.S. courts to reach distressed Eurozone transactions, litigants must prove both that Congress intended for the federal law to apply extraterritorially and that the intrusion into international affairs does not violate comity between U.S. law and Eurozone law. 126 123. Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders, 701 F.3d at 1069. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that "the Bankruptcy Code precludes non-consensual, non-debtor releases," and thus did not reach the question of whether the concurso plan "would be manifestly contrary to the fundamental public policy of the United States." Id. 
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Analysis of Statutory Jurisdiction
It is well settled that "Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States." 127 In addition, it is presumed that "when it desires to do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of a statute." 128 A presumption thus exists "that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 129 This presumption may be overcome by some "clearly expressed purpose" to apply the law extraterritorially, 130 demonstrated by the three-factor test the Supreme Court announced in Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo. 131 This test provides that the courts must review the statutory language, the statute's legislative history, and any administrative interpretations of the statute. 132 Section 541 of the Code defines what property and interests belonging to a debtor constitute the bankruptcy estate over which the court has custody. 133 Applying the Foley Brothers factors, the operative language of § 541 provides that as of the commencement of a case under Title 11, the estate "is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held." 134 Congress amended § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of § 541, in 1952 to include the phrase "wherever located." 135 The House Report connected with the amendment explained that the phrase makes "clear that a trustee in bankruptcy is vested with the title of the bankruptcy in property which is located without, as well as within, the 138 Despite the apparent extraterritorial application of § 541 using the Foley Brothers factors, courts remain split as to whether § 541 may apply extraterritorially to incorporate foreignbased property. 139 The dispute centers around whether the widely recognized extraterritorial application of § 541 also includes the trustee's avoidance powers under § 548. 140 The academic community has articulated eloquent arguments for both sides of the debate. 141 [Vol. 38:3 yet spoken, instead rejecting the opportunity to settle the circuit split over the Code's extraterritorial application. 142 As a result, courts remain split over whether the language of § 541 incorporates foreign transferred property pre-petition. 143 The Fifth Circuit has twice held that the trustee's strong-arm powers under Title 11 may be applied extraterritorially through § 541, either because the estate retains an equitable interest in fraudulently transferred property, 144 or because the estate regains an equitable interest in fraudulently transferred property following a § 550 recovery order. 145 Although the Fifth Circuit's logic has been criticized as circular, 146 at least one court has concluded that because fraudulent transfers involve transitory law, such actions may be brought wherever personal jurisdiction has been established. 147 
Analysis of International Comity
In addition to concerns about § 548 importing extraterritoriality from § 541, litigants must also address principles of inter- national comity. Courts look to factors such as, (1) the regulations and laws of the potentially conflicting foreign territory; (2) the connection and economic activities between the parties and this territory; (3) the likelihood of conflict of laws; and (4) the foreign territory's interest in regulating the transaction. 148 At least one court has required that an actual conflict between foreign and domestic law exist in order to violate international comity. 149 Moreover, Chapter 15 would appear to settle concerns about international comity and provide statutory cover for courts to reach Eurozone transactions, at least on its face, especially if the foreign jurisdiction has adopted UNCINTRAL's Model Law and embraced universalism.
Alternative Options to Overcoming the Extraterritoriality Hurdle
If litigants are unable to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality using the Foley Brothers factors, one option remains-prove that the presumption never arose. First, the presumption does not arise if the transfer occurred in the United States. 150 As many transactions touch several territorial jurisdictions simultaneously, some courts avoid the presumption if the United States was the "center of gravity." 151 Likewise, the presumption does not arise if the property recovered was already considered part of the estate, either through an action under 11 U.S.C. § 549, 152 or by a convincing argument extending the inclusion date for the property before the petition date. 
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Litigants may also argue that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not arise in bankruptcy proceedings because bankruptcy is materially different from other legal contexts and requires special consideration. 154 In French, one judge concurred to emphasize his view that the Supreme Court's "strong presumption against extraterritoriality" remained "intact" after the panel's decision. 155 Judge Wilkinson distinguished prior precedent because, in the context of anti-discrimination or hourly wage laws, "ease of administration is not the raison d'être, and congressional intent for extraterritorial application is considerably less clear." 156 As a result, litigants must argue that bankruptcy should be considered separately, and not be grounds "to set forth general pronouncements on extraterritoriality." 157 Finally, litigants seeking to reach Eurozone transactions may be able to use the Affiliate Rule to file in a circuit willing to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially. This rule allows a company to file either in the jurisdiction of its principal place of business, 158 or in that of an affiliated company. 159 Of course, the rule cannot be used offensively to establish business in a favorable jurisdiction solely for the purpose of filing bankruptcy, 160 but it "is the rare case, indeed, in which a debtor's business does not have some international aspect." 161 In the age of global business operations, the Affiliate Rule casts a wide-enough net to reach most major U.S. jurisdictions for bankruptcy filings.
If successful in overcoming the hurdles of Chapter 15 and extraterritoriality, litigants will have gained access to, at the minimum, U.S. district courts. But the final hurdle will deterestate, despite the transaction occurring as much as a year before bankruptcy in some cases 163 In fact, although Stern considers the authority of bankruptcy courts, the decision "is not really a bankruptcy decision at all; it is a constitutional separation of powers decision." 164 Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 165 Bankruptcy judges are not Article III judges; they lack the hallmark characteristics of life tenure and salary protection. 166 Instead, bankruptcy judges' powers come from Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress "[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." 167 As a result, bankruptcy courts exercising the judicial power of the United States would constitute one branch of the government aggrandizing its powers to the detriment of another branch, violating the separation of powers. 168 Although money and job security may appear to be insignificant reasons for such a dis- 
[Vol. 38:3 tinction, the Framers of the Constitution recognized that these two features protect the courts from tyranny. 169 The Stern Court held a non-Article III court violated the separation of powers by entering a final order in a common law case reserved for Article III courts. 170 Although the holding in Stern was self-limiting, 171 "a maelstrom of opinions and articles have been written about the scope of Stern, ranging in tone from 'much ado about nothing' to 'the end of the bankruptcy world as we know it.'" 172 Caught squarely in the middle is whether bankruptcy courts have authority to enter final orders in fraudulent transfer actions.
Statutory Framework for Bankruptcy Courts' Jurisdiction
To explain the implications of Stern, some discussion of the authority allocation between district courts and bankruptcy courts is necessary. Article I of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to create laws regarding the debtor-creditor relationship in bankruptcy. 173 location scheme and restructured jurisdictional allocations under Title 28. 177 Under the revised allocation framework, federal district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction for all cases arising under Title 11. 178 Section 157(a) provides statutory authority for district courts to refer jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts for those cases falling "under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11." 179 By way of referral, bankruptcy courts have in rem authority over "all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate." 180 District courts supervise referrals with the ability to withdraw the reference at any time by their own motions. 181 Even looking beyond the plain language of the referral statute, the Supreme Court has recognized that "Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate." 182 Before her appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor defended this principle and noted that the Supreme Court and other courts "have broadly construed the jurisdictional grant in [the 1984 Act]." 183 Moreover, the express "language of § 1334(b) must be read to give district courts (and bankruptcy courts under § 157(a)) jurisdiction over more than simple proceedings involving the property of the debtor or the estate." 184 Congress allocated original jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts to hear and determine proceedings concerning estate property
[Vol. 38:3 that arise in a bankruptcy case or under Title 11. 185 "Arising in" jurisdiction pertains to matters that could only arise in a case under Title 11. 186 By comparison, "arising under" jurisdiction includes proceedings created by Title 11. 187 Taken together, actions "arising in" or "arising under" comprise core proceedings within bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. 188 Bankruptcy courts may hear and determine these core matters and enter final orders, which are subject to appellate review by the district court under a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. 189 
Why Stern Creates a Problem for the Current Framework
Instead of "arising in" or "arising under" jurisdiction, Stern involved only the third type of original bankruptcy court jurisdiction under § 157(a): proceedings "related to" the bankruptcy. 190 A proceeding invokes "related to" jurisdiction when the "action is related to bankruptcy [in that] the outcome could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action." 191 Put simply, "a civil proceeding is related to a [T]itle 11 case if the action's outcome might have any conceivable effect on the bankrupt estate." 192 "Related to" jurisdiction stands on an opposite edge of the jurisdictional canyon from core proceedings allocated under § 157(b)(1). Proceedings invoking only "related to"-and not "arising in" or "arising under"-jurisdiction are not core proceedings. 193 Absent consent of the parties under § 157(c)(2), the statute at most authorizes bankruptcy courts in "related to" proceedings to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court for a de novo review. 194 
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Stern involved a dispute over a considerable inheritance, and a widow's attempt to recover in bankruptcy court for a tort claim against her late husband's son. 195 The tort claim was not predicated on the bankruptcy, meaning it neither arose nor was it tried exclusively in connection with a case under Title 11. 196 Therefore, because of the conceivable effect on the estate, § 157(c) should have allocated jurisdiction over the purely state-law counterclaim under the "related to" or non-core framework. 197 But because Congress included counterclaims by the estate in the non-exhaustive list of core proceedings in the 1984 Act, 198 the bankruptcy court relied on this list to enter a final order. 199 The Stern Court rejected the defunct label under § 157(b)(2)(C) for state law counterclaims as core proceedings, but declared only this narrow sub-provision to be unconstitutional. 200 Absent consent, which the Court determined was not given for the counterclaim, 201 the bankruptcy court's only authority under the § 157 allocation scheme was to submit proposed findings to the district court. 202 Even assuming that the Court's holding in Stern affected proceedings that did not invoke solely "related to" jurisdiction, a bankruptcy court may still hear and determine such matters after Stern with the consent of the parties. 203 Chief Justice Roberts defined "core proceedings [as] those that arise in a bankruptcy case or under Title 11." 204 Thus the Court is referring to the only remaining original bankruptcy jurisdiction-"related to"-when it states, "parties may consent to entry of final judgment by [a] bankruptcy judge in non-core case." 205 The Court neither rejected
[Vol. 38:3 any other core proceeding under § 157(b), nor renounced bankruptcy courts' ability to hear and submit proposals and conclusions under the § 157(c)(1) allocation scheme. 206 What the Stern decision has done is to revive arguments over significant dicta in the decision of Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg. 207 The Supreme Court in Granfinanciera held that a foreign party subjected to a fraudulent transfer action retained the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because the proceeding was legal, not equitable, and because it closely mirrored a common law action. 208 Although it decided the case on Seventh Amendment grounds, the Court indicated that the fraudulent transfer action was a private and not public right, despite arising under Title 11. 209 The opinion in Granfinanciera echoed many of the Supreme Court's earlier concerns in Marathon about non-Article III courts and the scope of public rights, 210 although it specifically rejected any limitation that would have mandated that the federal government be a party in all cases involving public rights. 
How Lowers Courts Are Grappling with Stern's Implications
This revival of Granfinanciera, along with the maelstrom surrounding Stern, has created considerable consternation among bankruptcy courts and practitioners trying to grapple with its implications. 212 In addressing Stern, lower courts of all levels have fallen into either the narrow, neutral, or expansive interpretive camps. 213 Despite the self-limiting holding, one commentator advocating for an expansive view of Stern astutely summarized his camp's general sentiment:
"Justice Breyer may not have been able to command a majority of the court and thus be 'constitutionally correct,' but he has definitely been right about one thing: Justice Roberts's statement that as a 'practical matter' the Stern v. Marshall decision 'does not change all that much' was either tongue-incheek or decidedly incorrect." 214 Within the context of fraudulent transfers brought under the Code, the expansive camp may have an argument that the progeny of Marathon, Granfinanciera, and Stern preclude adjudication in bankruptcy courts. 215 
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Several circuits have addressed Stern issues in bankruptcy and fraudulent transfer contexts. 216 The Fifth Circuit held that Stern does not affect the jurisdictional allocation for magistrate courts, 217 and later the circuit reemphasized its reasoning in a bankruptcy context. 218 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit rejected bankruptcy courts' authority in an "arising in" proceeding seeking damages provided for by a state statute regarding the disclosures of confidential medical records. 219 And the Ninth Circuit recently issued an expansive reading of Stern, holding that a fraudulent conveyance claim against a non-creditor brought under 11 U.S.C. § 548 did not fall within the public rights exception 220 and that a bankruptcy court was authorized only to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 221 If bankruptcy courts can adjudicate fraudulent transfers after Stern, it will likely be through the public rights doctrine, a judicially created exception to Article III adjudication. 222 The exception is linked to Congress's Article I legislative powers. 223 Congress may except three types of powers from Article III determinations: (1) territorial courts, (2) courts martial, and (3) cases involving public rights. 224 Cases falling within these three categories "may be removed from [Article] III courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination." 225 Although the public rights doctrine was first applied to a dispute between the government and an individual, 226 it has since been recognized to include actions where the government is not a formal party. 227 Congress may create rights under a public regulatory scheme that bear "many of the characteristics of a public right," even when the right is to be appealed, references to be withdrawn, or judgments to be entered after the bankruptcy court's submission of proposed findings; 248 and demands for jury trials. 249 Although these additional steps were often simply assumed before Stern, 250 they will now cause foreign litigants to expend more time, money, and resources defending themselves in courts in which they never intended to litigate.
CONCLUSION: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE TWO AND A HALF HURDLES
Each of these hurdles to U.S. adjudication will cause further argument and delay in cases, inevitably leading to more money spent. 251 But arguments for and against adjudication that have been persuasive with many courts exist at each hurdle. Foreign counterparties must argue that the plain meaning of, and congressional intent behind, Chapter 15 provides a clear directive for U.S. recognition of, and cooperation with, foreign proceedings. In comparison, litigants seeking to obviate Chapter 15 will argue that (1) ambiguity exists related to the United States exporting its laws; 252 (2) domestic creditor interests are best protected in U.S. courts; or (3) express qualifications requiring that U.S. law be applied elsewhere are necessary. 253 Alternatively, counterparties may argue that distressed Eurozone transactions are so egregious as to invoke Chapter 15's exception for "manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States," 254 although this exception requires a high standard of proof. 255 
